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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
On the basis of the evidence presented, it is not likely that action by
the Supreme Court will result in the abolition of loan financed insurance;
the definition of "interest" for tax purposes will probably be clarified and
existing statutes interpreted in a manner that can be expected to curtail the
abuses of the interest-deduction factor in loan-financed annuity contracts.
W. D. WALLACE
INTERNAL REVENuE-DEDUCTIONS IN GENERAL-WHETHER INSURANCE
PROCEEDS RETAINED UNDER A SETTLEMENT OPTION MAY QUALIFY FOR THE
MARITAL DEDUCTION-An interesting attempt to define what constitutes a
terminable interest in relation to life insurance policy proceeds is to be
found in the recent case of Estate of Werbe v. United States.' In that
case certain policies of insurance on the life of the decedent provided that
the proceeds of the policies, payable on receipt of proof of death, were to
be retained by the insurance company which was then to make monthly
payments to the decedent's widow. The policy provisions further stated
that in the event the wife should not survive, or should die while the
above-mentioned settlement was operative, any amount due on the pro-
ceeds was to be equally divided between the insured's sons as secondary
beneficiaries. The widow was also given the right to make withdrawals in
whole or in part from the proceeds retained by the insurer, but only on
interest payment dates, the first of which would fall one month after the
death of the insured for certain of these policies and a year later for one
other, and then in amounts not smaller than a sum stipulated. Following
the decedent's death, and the filing of an estate tax return, the Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue excluded the value of these five insurance
policies in determining for estate tax purposes the amount of the marital
deduction. An additional tax was paid and the taxpayer then sued for
a refund of an alleged overpayment. Both the district court and the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, agreeing with the Commissioner,
concluded that the widow had only a terminable rather than an absolute
interest in the proceeds of the insurance policies, because the proceeds
could pass to the sons for less than full consideration and also because she
did not have a power of appointment exercisable in all events, so recovery
of the additional tax paid was denied.
The marital deduction2 provision was inserted in the Internal Revenue
Act of 1948 to equalize tax advantages in the common law and community
property states and its purpose was to permit the surviving spouse to
1273 F. (2d) 201 (1959), affirming 178 F. Supp. 704 (1959).
2 nt. Rev. Code. See. 812(e).
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take a portion of the deceased spouse's estate free of the burden of
federal estate taxes,3 Having been enacted to put the common law states
on an equal footing with the community property states the provision
would not, of course, apply to the community property states. 4 For those
areas where applicable, as in the instant case, the marital deduction provi-
sion permits the withdrawal of an amount up to fifty percent of the
adjusted gross estate, as computed for federal estate taxes, from taxation
providing this interest in property passes to or has passed from the de-
cedent to the surviving spouse. 5 But the deduction is restricted by the
requirement that if this interest in property should, by reason of a lapse
of time, because of an event or contingency, or by virtue of the non-
occurrence of an event or contingency, fail to pass to and vest in the sur-
viving spouse, the interest is then to be regarded as a terminable interest
and no marital deduction is to be allowed with respect thereto.6 The precise
moment to which one must look in determining whether the interest passing
to the surviving spouse is or is not terminable is the instant of the death of
the decedent.
7
It should be noted that, in the instant case, the surviving spouse had
to wait until the first interest payment dates subsequent to proof of death
before she could, if she should so desire, draw down the proceeds of the
various insurance policies. As to certain of these policies, the first interest
payment date was to be thirty days after the date of death of the decedent;
as to one other, the controlling date was as long as one year after the
date of death. In the light of these circumstances the court, holding that
these policies represented only terminable interests, reasoned in effect
that, as it was possible that the surviving spouse might die during these
respective periods of time, the proceeds of the policies could pass to
secondary beneficiaries for less than a full consideration. In arriving at
this result, the court looked to the philosophy reflected in the case of
In re Wolf's Estates where it was indicated that the allowance of the
marital deduction for federal estate tax purposes is a matter of legislative
and statutory privilege rather than a matter of right, as a consequence
of which a court is not required to construe the statute not to examine
into the equities of the particular case.
To offset this reasoning, the petitioner had insisted that the time
periods in question were introduced into the policies as mere administra-
3 Pitts v. Hamrick, 228 F. (2d) 486 (1955).
4 California Trust Co. v. Riddell, 136 F. Supp. 7 (1955).
5 See note 2, ante.
6 In re Reilly's Estate, 239 F. (2d) 797 (1957).
7 Shedd's Estate v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 237 F. (2d) 345 (1956).
8 264 F. (2d) 82 (1959).
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tive conveniences for the benefit of the insurance companies and had
nothing to do whatever with the surviving spouse's vested right to draw
down the proceeds of the policies. In fact the director of the Estate
Planning Service of one of the companies, testifying on behalf of the
petitioner, offered proof that such provisions were commonly inserted into
life insurance policies for the convenience of the insurers in order to
minimize administrative expense and that his company would have paid
the entire proceeds promptly at any time upon the request of the surviving
spouse. Further interpretation was given to the meaning of the contract
by testimony to the effect that had the spouse died prior to receipt of
proof of death of the insured, the company would have paid the money
to the beneficiary spouse's personal representative. The petitioner also
relied upon a Treasury Department Regulation 9 which indicated that
contracts of the kind in question were not to be disqualified merely be-
cause the surviving spouse had to comply with certain formalities in order
to obtain payment.
Despite these arguments, the court chose to follow the language of
the statute as written; in fact, it went beyond the particular provision
to point out that, even if it was possible as a practical matter that the
surviving spouse might have secured all the proceeds under certain circum-
stances, the surviving spouse did not have a power of appointment ex-
ercisable in all events as required by another section of the Code' 0 as
interpreted by the case of Starrett v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue."
Whether or not the Supreme Court will uphold the strict interpreta-
tion placed on the statute by the Court of Appeals is a moot point. Cer-
tainly all estate planners are hoping the court will reverse this decision.
But until that is done, the result of the decision requires that all optional
settlement arrangements of life insurance policy proceeds, intended to
qualify for the marital deduction, must be promptly reviewed or renuncia-
tion of wills and increased tax burdens will be likely to result from
inattention thereto. If policies are not revised to provide for a lump sum
payment to the surviving spouse effective upon the death of the decedent,
then life insurance companies must be asked to delete the objectionable
'administrative facility" clauses from their policies. As a further protec-
tive step, the surviving spouse should be given the power by the insurance
contract, to appoint the payment of any unpaid proceeds remaining at his
or her death to anyone he or she may see fit to designate including his or
her estate.
D. J. A. HAYES, JR.
9 Treasury Department Regulation 105, Section 81.47 A (d).
10 Int. Rev. Code Sec. 812(g).
11223 F. (2d) 163 (1955).
